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Exchange Rate Volatility in BRICS Countries 
Introduction 
Global economic leadership is progressively shifting from the G7 to the BRICS, the popular 
symbol use to refer to Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. Goldman and Sachs 
(Wilson and Purushothaman, 2003) projects that the BRICS will “overtake” the G6 (UK, US, 
France, Italy, Japan and Germany) by 2040. Indeed, China passed Japan in 2010 to become the 
second largest economy (Dawson and Dean, 2011) while Brazil just overtook the UK (BBC, 
2011). The BRICS are first characterized by an astonishing economic growth, from 5% to a two-
digit annual growth, depending on the countries (The World Bank Indicators, 2011). Together, 
the BRICS represent 30% of the global economic growth, 40% of the world’s population and 
25% of the global land mass (Sule, 2011). Their combined GDP is estimated at $8.7 trillion 
(Sule, 2011). Consumption in the BRICS is high and increasing at a fast pace while the first 
economies (G3: US, Europe and Japan), affected by the recent financial crisis, have been 
penalized by a low final demand (Yamakawa et al., 2009). Not surprisingly, it is estimated that 
by 2032, four of these countries will be among the five largest economies (Sule, 2011). 
The BRICS are also becoming dominant in international trade. Exports have recently been 
growing at a 38% per annum rate in Brazil, 28% in India, 25% in China and 18% in Russia 
(Vardi, 2011). Their combined trade was estimated at $4.4 trillion in 2008 (Sule, 2011). In 
addition, trade with developing countries is growing three times faster (25% per year) than 
among developed countries. BRICS have contributed up to 60% of the trade between low-
income countries (Sule, 2011). As the bulk of this trade is done in USD, the BRICS have 
accumulated dollar reserves such that today, these countries hold 40% of the World’s currency 
reserves (Sule, 2011). The U.S. dollar (USD) has lost some of its leadership as a stable and 3 
 
strong currency, particularly now with the seemingly every increasing US national debt. This 
USD instability is an issue of concern for the leaders of the BRICS who have already proposed a 
move away from the use of the USD as vehicle currency. Most likely, they would use their local 
currencies in bilateral trade. As a matter of fact, China and Russia have already started to trade 
using their own currencies. There are strong reasons for this change. First, it would allow BRICS 
to diversify their foreign reserves as a way of managing the risk. Second, if the BRICS use their 
national currency to trade and they experience a bright future as predicted, their currencies may 
become global. Third, it is believed that the use of BRICS currencies would decrease transaction 
costs compared to the USD. Fourth, this would also allow the BRICS to have a greater political 
power in international negotiations. Finally, and much more hypothetically, by using their 
national currency, the BRICS may lay the foundation for a monetary union. Note however that in 
order to use their national currencies in lieu of the USD, the BRICS will have to face many 
constraints. The first is to select a particular currency of one of the members. Currently, the size 
of the Chinese economy and trade volume makes the YUAN the most likely currency. Another 
issue is that the trade among the BRICS is still very small compared to the bilateral trades with 
the US and European countries. This still obligates them to use the USD in the majority of their 
transactions. 
The recent interest of the BRICS to develop a common currency was worthy of business news in 
2011.  While progress on this issue may seem latent, it appears timely to investigate such 
possibility. This paper introduces very preliminary empirical evidence on the impact of the USD, 
Euro and Yen (the three currencies of the so-called G-3) on the BRICS’ trade. The question of 
interest in this paper is the examination of the effect of exchange rate volatility of the G-3 
currencies on agricultural exports of each of the BRICS. To this aim, the paper is structured as 4 
 
follows.  The next section provides a brief review of literature. The methodology is presented in 
section 3, followed by the data section.  Results and conclusions are the last two sections of the 
paper. 
Literature Review 
Under the Bretton Woods system the exchange rate between the US dollar and the other 
currencies was fixed. Following its collapse in 1973, economists’ interest shifted towards the 
impact of exchange rate volatility, especially on trade and investment. In spite of a vast literature 
on the matter, the effect of floating exchange rates on trade remains controversial (Krugman and 
Obstfeld, 2003). Note also that even if the Bretton-Woods system is not in force anymore, the 
reserves of the central banks of the world remain constituted of few currencies which are 
generally the US dollar and the Euro (Krugman and Obstfeld, 2003). The theory behind the 
relationship between exchange rate volatility and trade is that if we consider two exporting 
countries and assuming that there is no future or forward market for foreign exchange such that 
the exporters cannot lock a price, they can incur a risk at the moment of the conversion (Bailey et 
al., 1987). Clearly, a company which is selling its goods abroad will be paid in the currency of 
the buyer (i.e. importer), and once the payment is made, the company will have to convert back 
to its home currency. The issue is that it can take a long time from the moment that the 
merchandise is on a ship to the moment the full payment is made such that the currency of the 
seller can depreciate or appreciate relative to the currency of the buyer. Depending on how 
currency fluctuates, she/he will gain or lose. The effect of exchange rate volatility on trade is 
closely tied to risk-aversion behavior. If the exporter is risk adverse, she/he will require a 
premium. Graphically, we can think of this phenomenom as a left shift of the supply curve 
(Bailey et al., 1987) which represents a decrease in trade. Foreign exchange markets allow the 5 
 
exporter to hedge the risk without making it totally disappear. Many authors have attempted to 
measure the effect of exchange rate volatility on trade. One of the pioneer works is that of 
Hooper and Kohlhagen (1976). In their paper, they looked at the effect of dollar-deutschmark 
fluctuations on the trade of the US, Germany and other industrialized countries. They estimated a 
system of equations that include export supply and import demand functions. Exchange risk 
(uncertainty) was measured using the average absolute deviation. They disassociated the impact 
of exchange rate uncertainty on importers from the one on exporters. Depending on who is 
bearing the risk (i.e. importers or exporters), the effect on the price of traded goods will be 
positive (exporters) or negative (importers). Surprisingly they did not find any significant 
relationship between the exchange rate uncertainty and the volume of trade. A decade later, 
Bailey et al. (1987) assessed the effect of exchange rate volatility on export growth for eleven 
OECD countries, using quarterly data that covered the pre- and post-Bretton Woods collapse 
(1962-1974 and 1975-1985). They estimated a linear regression of exports (in volume) on a 
measure of economic growth in trade partner countries, a measure of export prices relative to 
those of trade partner countries, real export earnings of oil exporting countries and exchange rate 
variability. Two measures of variability were used for both nominal and real exchange rates. The 
first was the logarithms of the moving standard deviations. The second corresponds to 
polynomial distributed lag of the absolute-percentage-change. They found a positive relationship 
between real exports and nominal exchange rate variability but a negative relationship when the 
real exchange rate volatility was included (Bailey et al., 1987). With the development of new 
theories and methodologies in time-series econometrics such as cointegration and error 
correction models (Engle and Granger, 1987 and Johansen, 1988 and 1991), economists have 
started to look at the long-run relationships between exchange rate volatility and export flows. 6 
 
Example of authors that have employed cointegration tests and error correction models are Arize 
et al. (2000). They have explored the effect of real exchange rate volatility on export flows for 13 
developing countries. They found a negative and significant relationship in both short and long 
run (Arize et al., 2000). Other authors (e.g., Kroner and Lastrapes, 1990) have used (G)ARCH 
model (and extensions) to investigate the relationship between exchange rate volatility and trade 
on the premises that exchange rates cluster in period of high or low volatility (i.e. time-varying 
conditional volatility). Kroner and Lastrapes (1990) found a small but significant effect of 
exchange rate volatility on trade and observed that this effect varies across the countries. Koray 
and Lastrapes (1989) studied the relationships between real exchange rate volatility and US 
imports using a VAR model where macro variables are included and found a very weak effect. 
This literature is far from exhaustive but emphasized the diversity of methodologies and case-
studies. An interested reader may want to refer to McKenzie (1999) for a complete literature 
review on the impact of exchange rate volatility on trade flows.  
Since Europe, the US and Japan absorb a large portion of the World trade and the Euro, 
Dollar and Yen are the main vehicle currencies, developing countries’ trade is most likely to be 
impacted by the volatility of the above-mentioned currencies. Cushman (1986) was the first to 
investigate these so-called third-country effects. He cleverly explains why we would expect these 
effects to be significant. “While increased dollar-pound risk would be expected to reduce US 
exports to the UK, increased dollar-mark might increase the US to UK flow as US exporters 
substitute British for German markets” (Cushman, 1986, p.361). He indeed found significant 
third-country effects analyzing bilateral exports between the US and its then main trading 
partners. More recently, Esquivel and Larraín (2002) have looked at the impact of G-3 (US, 
Japan and Germany) exchange rate volatility on developing countries. They used monthly data 7 
 
from 1973 to 1998. The beginning of the studied period corresponds to the collapse of the 
Bretton-Woods system and the end, falls few years earlier than the introduction of the Euro. To 
measure volatility they used the standard deviation of the growth rates of real exchange rates 
(12-months moving-average) and the coefficient of variation of the real exchange rate. They then 
looked at the impact of the G-3 exchange rates on the effective real exchange rates of 28 
developing countries by carrying out regressions of the log-differences (rate of changes) of the 
effective real exchange rate on the log-differences of the bilateral real exchange rate Deutsche 
mark/dollar and Yen/dollar (Esquivel and Larraín, 2002). They complemented their analysis by 
carrying out a series of regressions of the logarithm of real exports on the logarithm of GDP, the 
bilateral real exchange rate with respect to the dollar and a measure of exchange rate volatility 
(Esquivel and Larraín, 2002). They also explore the impact of G-3 currency volatility on foreign 
direct investment. They globally found that the G-3 exchange rate volatility has had a negative 
impact on the exports of developing countries. In particular, a 1% increase in volatility would 
result in a 2% decrease in developing countries real exports (Esquivel and Larraín, 2002). In 
addition, it seems that the G-3 exchange rate volatility depresses foreign direct investment in 
developing countries. The findings of Esquivel and Larraín (2002) have motivated the present 
research. 
Methodology 
The real exchange rate (RER) was computed by deflating exchange rates using the involved 
countries CPIs. Standard deviation and coefficient of variation of the RER rates of change are 
traditionally used in the economic literature as measures of volatility (e.g., Esquivel and Larraín 
(2002)). In order to compute the standard deviation of RER, the rates of change are calculated as 
the natural log of real exchange rate at month (t) minus the natural log of the real exchange rate 8 
 
at a lagged month (t-1) and the resulting number multiplied by 100. For example, the January-
2001 exchange rate volatility is the standard deviation of the monthly rates of change (ROC) of 
the previous year; February-2001 volatility is then computed using last year ROC (t-1) until 
January-2001 ROC; and the volatility for the subsequent months is computed in the same 
fashion.  
        √[
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      ]  (1) 
The coefficient of variation is obtained in the same fashion as the standard deviation, except for 
the very last step on which the already computed standard deviation is divided by the average of 
the rates of change. Esquivel and Larraín (2002) found the coefficient of variation more efficient 
when predicting volatility. In the present paper both measures of volatility are used in the 
empirical analysis, 
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Both monthly variables (STD and CV) are then converted into annual by taking the 
arithmetic average over 12 periods. 
Economic Model 
The role of exchange rate in trade flows is very well known in the field of international trade 
(Esquivel and Larraín (2002), McKenzie (1999), Dell’Ariccia (1999), and Arize et al. (2000)). 
Relative price changes also affect international flows of merchandise. For instance, a weaker 
USD is expected to impulse the export engine of the United States and at the same time decrease 
imports as foreign goods become relatively more expensive. According to Brodsky (1984) higher 9 
 
exchange rate volatility may discourage risk averse and also perhaps risk neutral commodity 
traders, leading to a decrease in exports as they may not want to put profits into higher 
uncertainty. Esquivel and Larrain (2002) found that the instability of the major traded currencies 
such as the DEM, USD, and JPY is transmitted to bilateral exchange rates which in turn may 
reduce trade flows in developing countries. However the effect of third countries currency 
exchange rates on emerging economies has seldom been addressed. It is well known that world 
demand (i.e. exports) for goods goes along with the GDP, for example, there has beeb poor trade 
performance during the global economic downturn. When the economy is in expansion the 
amount of interaction between buyers and sellers is high and this determines exchange rates. 
Equation 3 summarizes the factors affecting exports as suggested by the economic theory. Notice 
that exports are a function of the world demand, bilateral and third country currency exchange 
rates. 
Exports=? (𝑊?𝑟?? 𝐷??𝑎??, 𝐵𝑖?𝑎??𝑟𝑎? 𝑈 -BRICS exchange rate, 𝐺−3  ?𝑟𝑟???𝑦  ??𝑎?𝑖?𝑖?𝑦). 
(3) 
Econometric Model 
We adopt a vector autoregressive model (VAR) for the specification of equation (3) and estimate 
a separate model for each BRICS country as follows: 
   
      
       
  
   
   
   
  
                    
                    
                    
   
     
        





              
   
   
   




  (4), 
where X are real exports, GDPw is the world GDP, RERus is the real exchange rate of the 
BRICS national currency per USD and k is the optimal lag length. The volatility of the yen-usd 
exchange rate and the volatility of the euro-usd exchange rate are considered as exogenous in the 10 
 
VAR. Before estimating the model, we carried out unit root tests (augmented Dickey-Fuller); 
these tests indicate that all variables expose I(2) behavior, except            and            
which behave as I(0). The selection of the optimal lag length is based on the Akaike selection 
criterion (AIC), using undifferenced data as suggested by Enders (2004). The maximum lag 
length in the AIC was set to three because of the small sample size. Cointegration was tested for 
I(2) variables using the Johansen’s procedure and the testing framework of RATS for I(2). A 
VAR (k) was estimated including a constant in the cointegrating vector as the variables did not 
have a clear tendency to increase or decrease. We used the modified Wald test introduced by 
Toda and Yamamoto (1995) to test Granger causality from exchange rate volatility to 
agricultural exports of each country by setting the dmax value to 2 for consistency with the unit-
root results.  This method is simple and easy to implement in testing for causality and has been 
shown in other studies (e.g., Zapata and Rambaldi (1997)) to work as well in small samples.  
Data 
National currency exchange rates per US dollars for Brazil, Russia, India, China, South 
Africa, Honduras, Euro Area and Japan were downloaded from the International Financial 
Statistics (IFS-IMF) browser (URL: http://www.imfstatistics.org/imf/logon.aspx). These data 
were obtained in a monthly frequency from January 1961 to December 2008. This data screening 
resulted in eight series containing 130 observations. Data for agricultural exports were found at 
the FAO website (URL: http://www.fao.org/economic/ess/countrystat/en/). Monthly and annual 
Consumer Price Indices (CPI-2005=100) for Euro-Area and each country were obtained from the 
Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD, URL 
http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx). Data for World Agricultural GDP and GDP deflator were 
downloaded from the World Bank website (URL: http://data.worldbank.org/). Monthly and 
Annual Free on Board (FOB) exports in millions of USD were downloaded from the IFS 




The Augmented Dickey-Fuller test with a constant and a trend was used to test for unit roots. 
The lag length in the ADF tests was selected using a modified AIC criteria (Enders, 2010). 
Results are shown in Table 1.  Real agricultural exports (RAGE), real agricultural GDP 
(RAGDP), exchange rates between a country’s currency and the dollar (Bil R_Ex Rate) are 
mainly I(2) variables for each country. The last four columns in Table 1 related to the volatility 
measures (coefficients of variation between the Euro and USD (CVEUSD) and between the Yen 
and the USD (CVYENUSD), and the standard deviations of the same variables) which are all 
I(0) variables. These results suggest the possibility of cointegration for I(2) variables (e.g. 
Johansen (1995)—see also CATS in RATS which does I(2) analysis). 
Table 1. Order of Integration of each series based on Dickey-Fuller tests 








1  Brazil  I(2)  I(2)  I(2)  I(0)  I(0)  I(0)  I(0) 
2  China  I(2)  I(2)  I(2)  I(0)  I(0)  I(0)  I(0) 
3  India  I(2)  I(2)  I(2)  I(0)  I(0)  I(0)  I(0) 
4  Russia  I(0)  I(2)  I(2)  I(0)  I(0)  I(0)  I(0) 
5  South 
Africa 
I(2)  I(2)  I(1)  I(0)  I(0)  I(0)  I(0) 
 
The volatility of the yen-usd and euro-usd exchange rates are stationary and enter the  
VAR as exogenous variables in levels. Real agricultural exports appear to be integrated of order 
two in most of the cases except for Russia. This result is however not surprising as there were 
only 17 observations for Russia. The real world agricultural GDP, common to all models, is I(2) 
and the bilateral exchange rates are generally I(2) except the Rand/USD. In view of these unit 
root test results, for Brazil, China and India the VAR models include real agricultural exports, 
real world agricultural GDP and bilateral exchange rates in addition to the exogenous variables 12 
 
(volatility of the yen-usd and euro-usd). In the case of Russia only the world GDP and the 
bilateral exchange rate were included as endogenous variables in the VAR. For South Africa, 
only agricultural exports and world agricultural GDP were simultaneously determined in the 
VAR. The real exchange rate between the Rand and USD is I(1) such that we consider it as an 
exogenous variable and the first differences are used for the estimation.  
Causality Tests 
The aim of this paper was to provide initial empirical evidence on the relationship between 
exchange rate volatility (in G-3 countries) and agricultural exports. One could proceed, as in 
Johansen (1997), and use the ECM model via MLE to conduct the tests on noncausality or apply 
alternative methods such as in Toda and Yamamoto (1995). We chose to apply the modified 
Wald test of Toda and Yamamoto because of its simplicity relative to the alternative LR test of 
Johansen. Thus the null hypothesis becomes that volatility in exchange rates does not cause 
agricultural exports of each country. Table 3 presents the p-values from the Granger causality 
tests performed between agricultural exports and G-3 exchange rate (EUR/USD and JPY/USD) 
volatility (CV and STD). The null hypothesis is only rejected in the case of Brazil and China. 
This means that the volatility, more specifically, STD RER EUR/USD and JPY/USD Granger 
causes Brazilian agricultural exports. In the case of China, STD RER JPY/USD Granger Causes 






Table 2. Granger Causality test coefficient of variation of the real exchange rates 
Ho (influenced by 
itself) 












Rage Brazil  CV EUR/USD and 
JPY/USD 
2  65  0.07  0.93
0 
 
Rage Brazil  CV EUR/USD  1  65  0.12  0.73
0 
 
Rage Brazil  CV JPY/USD  1  65  0.10  0.75
0 
 
Rage China  CV EUR/USD and 
JPY/USD 
2  40  1.50  0.23
5 
 
Rage China  CV EUR/USD  1  40  0.85  0.36
2 
 
Rage China  CV JPY/USD  1  40  2.07  0.15
8 
 
Rage India  CV EUR/USD and 
JPY/USD 
2  110  1.41  0.25
0 
 
Rage India  CV EUR/USD  1  110  1.92  0.16
8 
 
Rage India  CV JPY/USD  1  110  0.33  0.57
0 
 
Rage South Africa  CV EUR/USD and 
JPY/USD 
2  110  0.66  0.51
9 
 
Rage South Africa  CV EUR/USD  1  110  1.31  0.25
5 
 
Rage South Africa  CV JPY/USD  1  110  0.08  0.77
8 
 
Rage Brazil  STD EUR/USD and 
JPY/USD 
2  65  2.43  0.09
6 
* 
Rage Brazil  STD EUR/USD  1  65  4.81  0.03
2 
** 
Rage Brazil  STD JPY/USD  1  65  0.90  0.34
7 
 
Rage China  STD EUR/USD and 
JPY/USD 
2  40  1.69  0.19
7 
 
Rage China  STD EUR/USD  1  40  0.21  0.65
0 
 
Rage China  STD JPY/USD  1  40  3.09  0.08
6 
* 
Rage India  STD EUR/USD and 
JPY/USD 




Rage India  STD EUR/USD  1  110  0.12  0.72
9 
 
Rage India  STD JPY/USD  1  110  0.86  0.35
6 
 
Rage South Africa  STD EUR/USD and 
JPY/USD 
2  110  0.08  0.92
0 
 
Rage South Africa  STD EUR/USD  1  110  0.14  0.70
7 
 





This study investigated the relationship between volatility in exchange rates, Euro-USD and 
Yen-USD, on agricultural exports of Brazil, India, China and South Africa using a vector 
autoregressive model. We found that except for the volatility measures (coefficients of variation 
and standard deviations of monthly values), all variables were I(2).  We conducted a preliminary 
analysis using Johansen (1997) ECM for I(2) variables and found cointegration for some 
countries but not for others. Given the small sample size for some countries, and the fact that 
some variables were I(0), I(1) and I(2), we opted for the modified Wald tests (Toda and 
Yamamoto) to test for noncausality.  It was found that for China and Brazil, exchange rate 
volatility in the G-3 countries has a significant effect on agricultural exports. No significant 
effect was found for the other countries. 
  While these results are preliminary, and given the dominant exporting role that Brazil and 
China play in world trade, exchange rate volatility in some trade partners (U.S., Japan, and the 
Eurozone) raises the possibility that excessive volatility (such as the one experienced during the 
recent financial crises) may cause unwanted trade flows (increasing exchange rate risk may 
cause a decline in exports).  While an intuitive argument could be made that the BRICS can be 15 
 
better off by developing their own currency to price their commercial trade, or for issuing credits 
and grants to each other as signed in 2011, a more complete analysis that develops such currency 
or index is warranted and is a subject of future research.   16 
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